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O N 6 AUGUST 1926 A LARGE portion of the Lunenburg schooner fleet was fishing 
off Sable Island. Catches were good as the vessels topped off their loads before the 
voyage home. What happened next is best described by two fishing captains 
present at the time: 
That's what you call a fishermen's luck. You're anchored in the middle of the 
ocean and you got to take it as it comes. When you take your clothes on the 
vessel, you never know if you're acomin' back. Yes, when you think it over 
you never know if you're acomin' back. Well the weather-glass gave no 
warning. It showed nothing at all. At nine o'clock there was an ordinary 
breeze but at ten o'clock the sea come ahead of the wind and you knew there 
was somethin' back of it driving it. We got everything below. By that time 
the breeze was here and you couldn't walk along the deck. You had to get a 
rope and haul yourself along. We had twenty-four hundred quintals of fish 
when the gale come and the vessel was like a log. At twelve o'clock she broke 
adrift and she went two to three hours in eighteen to nineteen fathoms of 
water. The riding sail filled on the lee side. That hove her down and she was 
very slow comin' back, so slow it looked kinda suspicious at one time if she 
was ever comin' back. We put out oil and that helped some, but I never see a 
worse blow at sea. 
Describing what happened to his heavily laden vessel in the same storm another 
captain said: 
The sea would break from the bottom and strike us. The deck was swept 
clean by the gigantic sea. It took our boats and all our moveable gear. It 
smashed the skylight, the cabin doors and the cabin table. The stove and 
everything else was smashed. The cabin was half filled with water and the 
men washed around in the cabin and beat to pieces. Two men were washed 
overboard. We just saved them that was all. Nine men were injured with 
broken ribs and injured limbs and one man at the pump was half beaten to 
pieces with the terrific seas. George Locke, one of our best fishermen, was so 
badly injured that he has since died.1 
1 Herald (Halifax), 9 October 1926. 
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The crews of the Sylvia Mosher and the Sadie Knickle were not so fortunate as 
these men. Both schooners went down in the storm and on these two vessels alone 
47 men perished. It took more than two weeks to confirm that these vessels had 
been lost since, as was the case with all schooners, they did not have radios on 
board and could neither receive advance warning of storms nor send any distress 
signals. 
The 1926 disaster was an immense tragedy for the men and women caught in its 
grip, but it sparked only minor changes in the fishery. Only William Duff, 
publisher of the Lunenburg Progress-Enterprise, argued for the installation of 
transmitting and receiving radio equipment aboard all the Lunenburg schoon-
ers.2 There were a few requests that the federal government place a rescue ship out 
on the fishing banks to come to the aid of mariners in distress, but these were 
ignored. Even more telling was the absence of any investigation into the 
catastrophe. In the same storm, a Norwegian freighter, the Ringhorn, was lost off 
Scatarie Island on the east coast of Cape Breton, and five of the ship's crew died in 
the attempt to reach land. The loss of this foreign freighter gave rise to an inquiry 
within eleven days of the sinking, but no inquiry was ever held into the far larger 
disasters in the Nova Scotia schooner fleet.3 The following year, the Lunenburg 
vessel owners sent the fleet out to the fishing grounds, having learned nothing 
from these events. Once again none of the schooners was equipped with radios or 
improved safety equipment. Consequently, although the disaster which followed 
was "natural", its magnitude was inevitable because of the failure of the industry 
or the government to respond to the lessons of 1926. 
The storm that hit the Northeast Coast of North America on 24 August 1927 
was not a normal gale, but a storm of exceptional force, the worst in the history of 
the 20th century schooner fishery. As it swept up the coast it devastated the 
Lunenburg fleet as well as fishing fleets from the other Maritime ports 
andNewfoundland, and also struck inland throughout the region. In Nova Scotia 
alone, damage was estimated at approximately a million dollars.4 On 30 August, 
some six days after the storm, over 75 vessels from the Lunenburg fleet had still 
not been heard from. It was finally learned that four schooners had gone down, 
the Mahalia, the Joyce Smith, the Clayton Walters, and the Una J. Corkum. In 
the same vicinity as these vessels the Columbia, a banking schooner fishing out of 
Gloucester, Massachusetts, was lost with all hands, a crew of 20. In all 88 men 
belonging to the Lunenburg salt banker fleet lost their lives, while many others 
2 Progress-Enterprise (Lunenburg), 1 September 1926. 
3 Herald, 18 August 1926. 
4 Ibid., 26 August 1927. Cyril Robinson, in his Men Against the Sea, High Drama in the Atlantic 
(Hantsport, N.S., 1971), pp. 131-3, captures the savagery of this storm in his vivid description of 
the ordeal of Roland Knickle, captain of the Andrava, oneof the Lunenburg schooners to survive 
the gale off Sable Island. 
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were maimed or severely injured. At least another ten small boat fishermen were 
lost along the coast of Nova Scotia and large numbers of men off the coast of 
Newfoundland, although newspaper accounts of the number conflict because of 
the lack of communication between the vessels and the land.5 
It took up to a month before the fatalities were confirmed. The families of the 
men who died had then to face the loss of a loved one and the principal wage 
earner in the household. Fortunately, for most of the dependents, they were 
eligible to receive monetary compensation from the Nova Scotia Workmen's 
Compensation Board.6 Offshore fishermen in Nova Scotia had been included 
under the Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Act since 1920. However, the 
government's response to the plight of the relatives of some who died in 1927 was 
miserly.7 Widows received $30.00 a month for life or until they remarried and 
$7.50 a month for children under the age of 16 years. Many widows, whose 
husbands were Newfoundlanders, received nothing at all.8 Moreover, there is a 
bitter irony to the fact that all the suffering and the loss of lives in the gales of 1926 
and 1927 resulted in a worsening rather than an improvement in the compensa-
tion available to fishermen and in the safety conditions under which they worked. 
Inadequate as was the compensation given to the families after the deaths in 1926 
and 1927, it required a large payment from the funds of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Board. Because of the relations of production, economic conditions in 
the industry, and the political climate of the time, worker's compensation for 
offshore fishermen was privatized, thus removing any economic pressure on the 
Lunenburg fish merchants to improve their safety record. 
Although European workers had successfully demanded worker's compensa-
tion at the turn of the century, in North America these programs did not gain 
general favour until the period after 1910. Before this time, damages for workers 
injured or killed could only be won through private costly court cases. Although 
accidents very often resulted from employer negligence, few workers or their heirs 
could succeed in proving the employer at fault and receive compensation.9 
5 Herald, 29-30 August 1927. 
6 The name of the Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Board was changed to the Nova Scotia 
Worker's Compensation Board in the mid 1970s. When not referring specifically to the 
Workmen's Compensation Board in the particular time period the author uses the term worker's 
compensation. 
7 Workmen's Compensation Board of Nova Scotia, Annual Report (1921). 
8 From the turn of the century, many of the crew members on the offshore fishing vessels operating 
out of Nova Scotia, and particularly Lunenburg, were residents of Newfoundland. As a result 
they were not covered by Workmen's Compensation if they were injured or killed while working 
aboard the vessel. At least 19 of those who died in the 1927 disaster were determined to be 
Newfoundland residents. The families of these men did not receive any compensation from the 
Workmen's Compensation Board in Nova Scotia and were relegated to receiving piddling relief 
payments from the Newfoundland Government. 
9 James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State (Boston, 1968), p.41. 
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Michael Piva has pointed out that in Canada the establishment of Workmen's 
Compensation Boards was essentially an attempt to placate workers in the 
struggle between labour and capital.10 Dianne Pothier has pursued a different 
tack, adopting the position that worker's compensation was essentially a 
compromise between capital and labour.11 Under this compromise, workers were 
relieved of the responsibility of proving fault on the part of the employer; in 
return, they had to give up the right to sue both their own employer, and any other 
employer covered by the act. Employers, on the other hand, had to accept 
responsibility for injuries that occurred on the job. This responsibility included 
bearing the total cost of the insurance payments established for each industry or 
sub-class by the Workmen's Compensation Board. The employer then had an 
economic incentive to provide a safe workplace, since the rates set for each 
industry reflected the level of danger involved in that type of employment. Thus 
workers were offered a speedy remedy on a no fault basis in exchange for their 
acceptance of partial compensation.12 
In Nova Scotia, a government administered worker's compensation program 
can be traced to the endeavors by organized labour in 1907-1908. Through the 
efforts of John Joy, leader of the Longshoremen's Union in Halifax, and a 
vigorous campaign by labour with the support of Dr. Kendall, a maverick Liberal 
Member of the Legislative Assembly from Cape Breton, the first Workmen's 
Compensation Act was enacted in 1911.13 But offshore fishermen and most other 
industrial workers were not included until the revised act of 1915.14 In 1914 the 
Meredith Commission in Ontario examined the question of worker's compensa-
tion and recommended the creation of a new worker's compensation act which 
was passed in 1915.15 This Ontario act served as the basis for the revised 
10 Michael Piva, The Condition of the Working Class of Toronto 1900-1921 (Ottawa, 1979), 
pp. 107-8. 
11 Dianne Pothier, "Workers' Compensation: The Historical Compromise Revisited", Dalhousie 
Law Journal, 1, 2 (April 1983), p. 312. 
12 Under the-terms of the new act passed in Nova Scotia in 1916, workers would be eligible to receive 
"partial compensation" (a percentage of their wages) if unable to work due to an injury received 
on the job. This would be different from receiving "full compensation" which would mean 
receiving the same wage while injured as while working. The "partial compensation" received was 
based at that time on the industrial wages of the day, unlike present day workers' compensation 
rates which reflect current day social welfare rates. 
13 Geoff Clare, "The Workmen's Compensation Movement in Nova Scotia", unpublished paper, 
Dalhousie University, April 1976, pp. 38-40. 
14 Ibid., p.49. 
15 For an in-depth study of the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ontario and the Meredith 
Commission see R.C.B. Risk, "This Nuisance of Litigation: The Origins of Worker's 
Compensation in Ontario" in David Flaherty ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, Vol.11 
(Toronto, 1983), pp.418-91. The Workmen's Compensation Act of Ontario and the recommen-
dations of the Meredith Commission served as the basis for similar acts in other Canadian 
provinces. 
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Workmen's Compensation Act in Nova Scotia. A board was established to 
administer the act in Nova Scotia similar to that in Ontario.16 
There can be no question that fishermen needed some form of worker's 
compensation. The August Gales of 1926 and 1927 were dramatic events in which 
many men were lost at one time, but each year and every voyage brought brutally 
hard work, discomfort, and the dangers of death or disabling accidents. 
Fishermen who worked offshore during the early part of the 20th century usually 
worked aboard one of two types of vessels, a dory schooner or a "side" or "beam" 
trawler. On both types of vessels conditions were extremely dangerous. Dory 
schooners were 120-140 foot wooden sailing vessels with a crew of between 20-25. 
They usually carried six to eight "dories", small wooden boats approximately' 
16-18 ft. long, which put out from the schooner each day with one man or two 
men in each boat.17 The fishermen tended "trawls", long lines of baited hooks, 
and while waiting for the fish (primarily cod) to come on the trawls, would also 
"jig" for cod. After the fish were caught, the catch was brought back to the 
schooner where it was gutted and split on the deck of the schooner, then salted in 
the hold. Conditions aboard were primitive. Living and working on a schooner as 
a dory fisherman meant sharing a very confined space for up to three or four 
months at a time with 20 to 25 other men. The limited storage facilities meant 
that crew members could only have one spare change of clothes with them for the 
duration of the voyage, and it was impossible to use any of the fresh water aboard 
for washing either oneself or one's clothes. All fresh water was required for 
cooking and drinking purposes.18 
Trawling or handlining for cod in a dory left fishermen at the mercy of a hostile 
marine environment. To remain in contact with their schooners, dory fishermen 
could rely only on the foghorn in foggy weather, and without radios or any other 
means of communicating with the land, unexpected storms caught many 
schooner fishermen unprepared.19 With no engines, the schooners were less able 
to operate safely in a storm than powered vessels. It was only after the disasters of 
1926 and 1927 that Lunenburg schooners finally began using radios and auxiliary 
diesel engines.20 But injured crew members were forced to wait until the return of 
16 One of the three commissioners on this Board was John T. Joy, the President of the Halifax 
Longshoremen's Union, who had led the initial attempts to secure this kind of legislation. 
17 Some of the schooners used a "one man" dory system with one man hauling trawl. Although this 
was found to be not as productive as the two man dories, some schooners used this method into 
the 1920s. 
18 Interview with Fred Crouse, schooner fisherman, Audio Cassette tape, Fisheries Museum of the 
Atlantic, Lunenburg. For more information on living and working conditions on the fishing 
schooners, see Peter Barss, Images of Lunenburg County (Toronto, 1978). 
19 Interview with Lewis Firth, schooner fisherman, Written Transcript, Lunenburg, Nova Scotia, 
Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic, p.4. 
20 It is not clear if installing radios and engines aboard the schooners was done more to protect the 
investment (i.e. the catch and the vessel) than to aid the crew. 
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the vessel to port or they were transferred to another vessel heading into port, as 
there was no equivalent to modern air-sea rescue. With the schooners splitting 
and salting the catch, their captains had no incentive to come into port for 
weeks. The captains made their decisions on the fate of injured crew members 
with little if any medical training.21 Fire-fighting and life-saving equipment on 
the schooners was non-existent. Unexpected fires were fought by throwing 
water on them and if this proved unsuccessful, the crew abandoned ship in the 
dories and hoped for the best. 
Although living conditions on the trawlers were somewhat less severe than life 
aboard dory schooners, the dangers were almost as great.22 Unlike dory 
schooners, which were seasonal and operated from March to December, the side 
trawlers fished throughout the year. In winter the severe icing up of the 
superstructure imperiled the stability of the craft. Nothing guaranteed that any 
fire-fighting and life-saving equipment would be on board, for no regulations 
required vessels to carry such equipment. In most cases the safety equipment on 
board the ship at the time of construction — a life ring, a couple of life boats, a few 
fire buckets, and some axes — was all the vessel carried. The individual safety of 
the crew members appears to have been of little importance. Hard hats, steel-toed 
boots or personal flotation devices were unheard of. Such devices were not 
beyond the level of existing technology; survival suits for pilots attempting 
trans-Atlantic crossings were then being manufactured by the Miner Rubber 
Company in Quebec. Yet none of their survival suits were available to schooner 
and trawler fishermen even though this same company produced wet gear and 
rubber boots for the fishing industry.23 
The side or "beam" trawler was usually a steel-hulled, steam-powered vessel of 
British construction. It towed a net that was held open by two "doors". This type 
of gear was originally known as a "beam" trawl but had been modified for 
efficiency to become an "otter trawl".24 The net of the otter trawl was set out, 
usually over the starboard side of the fishing vessel,25 while it steamed port side to 
the wind. After the net was played out, the doors were let down, and the two 
ground warps — wire ropes or cables attached to the wings of the net — were let 
out at a distance that would permit the net to be towed along the bottom. After 
21 Personal Interview with Loraine Weagle, schooner fisherman 1920-1927, Dayspring, Nova 
Scotia, July 1987. 
22 Progress-Enterprise, 17 March 1920. 
23 Unpublished "Background Testimony" to the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of 
the Maritime Provinces and the Magdalen Islands (Ottawa, 1928), MG 6, vol. 7, p. 2610, Public 
Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS). 
24 Ralph F. Symonds and Henry O. Trowbridge, The Development of Beam Trawling in the North 
Atlantic (Quincy, Mass., 1947), pp.2-5. 
25 When on board a vessel and facing the bow "starboard" is the right side of the vessel and "port" 
the left side. 
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about two hours the crew hauled back the net using the huge winches on board to 
haul in the ground warps.26 Then, two crew members knocked the pin out of the 
towing block which held the ground warps together near the aft gallows. Once 
this pin was removed the "doors" of the trawl were hauled up and the net was 
pulled aboard by hand until the wings and belly of the net were on board. A large 
strap was placed around the funnel shaped end of the net, known as the "cod end", 
and a hook attached to a wire cable, known as a "jilson", was placed through the 
large strap wrapped around the cod end and winched aboard. The knot in the cod 
end was then untied, and the fish dumped in the fish pens on board the deck of the 
trawler. The knot was then retied and the net reset over the side. This whole 
procedure of "hauling back" the trawl was done while the vessel was "side on" to 
the wind with the port side of the vessel in the wind and the starboard side in the 
lee.27 In calm weather this procedure worked well. But in stormy weather, or while 
there was a considerable "swell" on, working on deck and hauling back the trawl 
were dangerous tasks. The cod end would swing back and forth in the air, usually 
with 2-3000 pounds of fish inside. The crew would scramble around on deck 
trying to control the net to get it lowered on deck and dumped. At the same time 
there was always the possibility (on a vessel broadside to the wind) of a wave 
coming in over the side and washing one of the crew members overboard. 
A vivid sense of the fishermen's precarious work world emerges from 
newspaper accounts in the years 1915-1920. The number of vessels sinking, in 
trouble, running aground, or breaking down is staggering.28 There are regular 
reports of persons being washed overboard, or crushed by cargo, and the loss of 
human life appears to have been accepted as part of the life of a sailor. Only with 
the large disasters, such as a large vessel going down with all hands, was there any 
outcry. Despite the dangers they faced, offshore fishermen in Nova Scotia initially 
did not receive coverage under the 1915 Workmen's Compensation Act because 
of a legal technicality; even though they were working for Nova Scotia employers, 
they were not working on Nova Scotia soil. The provincial government finally 
extended coverage to fishermen by passing an amendment in May 1919 stating 
that an employee-employer covenant made in Nova Scotia could permit the 
Compensation Act to apply beyond the province's borders.29 This decision must 
26 Frederick William Wallace, Roving Fisherman (an Autobiography) (Gardenvale, P.Q., 1955), 
pp. 310-32. 
27 Personal Interviews with Ned Ingram, North Sydney, August 1987; Gerald Collins, Mulgrave, 
July 1987; and Lewis Riggs, Louisbourg, August 1987; all trawler fishermen who fished on side 
trawlers. 
28 Herald, Record(Sydney) and Progress-Enterprise, November — April, 1915 to 1920. According 
to Jack Zinck in Shipwrecks of Nova Scotia, Vol. II (Hantsport, 1977), there were at least 83 
schooners, ranging from 10 to 725 gross registered tons, and 24 other vessels of various types lost 
during this period. 
29 Section 8 (8,a), Workmen's Compensation Act of Nova Scotia, Statutes of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 
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be understood as resulting from the general pressure from labour in the province, 
since the fishermen themselves had little power to affect government decisions.30 
Perhaps the Nova Scotia legislature was also influenced by the fact that the 
fishing fleet of Gloucester, Massachusetts, went on strike in July 1919, and 
activists from Gloucester had been in touch with fishermen in Yarmouth.31 
The Nova Scotia Workmen's Compensation Act was essentially an insurance 
program. The Workmen's Compensation Board set insurance rates, based on the 
amount of risk, by type of industry or employment. These were known as 
sub-classes. The thinking behind creating these sub-class divisions was that they 
would act as an incentive for employers in a particular industry to provide a safer 
work place since by reducing the number of accidents the assessment rate was 
reduced.32 In the fishing industry however, this concept was totally ignored and 
the vessel owners did not attempt to make their vessels any safer than they had 
been prior to their industry coming under Workmen's Compensation.33 
In 1921 an amendment made to the Workmen's Compensation Act set the 
maximum yearly compensation for fishermen covered under the act at 55 per cent 
of $780 or $429 per annum,34 considerably less than the figure of 55 per cent of 
$1200 per year, or $660 annually, which was the maximum set for workers in all 
other industries.35 Despite these lower amounts of compensation, the numbers of 
men dying or suffering injury in the fishery caused the rates in that sub-class to be 
high ($5 for every $100 of wages paid). From 1920 to 1925,54 people in the fishing 
sub-class died on the job. Another 123 were temporarily disabled and 13 were 
permanently partially disabled.36 Following the 1926 gale, the considerable 
payments made to the families of the Nova Scotians who died or were injured 
1919), ch. 61, pp.261 -5. 
30 At the same time the Nova Scotia Government was passing this amendment, both Halifax and 
Amherst were in the middle of major strikes (in Amherst it was a general strike) and the Winnipeg 
General Strike was in progress. 
31 Herald, 26 July 1919. 
32 David S. Beyer, Industrial Accident Prevention (Boston, 1917), p. 2. 
33 Interview with Lewis Firth, Lunenburg schooner fisherman, Written Transcript, Fisheries 
Museum of the Atlantic; personal interview with Loraine Weagle, Dayspring, Lunenburg 
County, retired schooner fisherman; personal interview with Ellsworth Greek, Blue Rocks, 
Lunenburg County, retired schooner and scallop dragger fisherman. 
34 The reasons for the amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act reducing the amount of 
compensation for fishermen is not clearly spelled out, but it is probably a reflection of declining 
salt fish prices on the international market which in turn greatly reduced fishermen's incomes. 
35 These ceilings for determining the amount of compensation were challenged in the courts in 1930; 
the County Court found in a fisherman's favour, but the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia 
overturned the ruling and found for the company and the lower rate of compensation. Maritime 
Fish Company vs Cohoon, Dominion Law Reports, 1 (1930), pp. 809-13. 
36 Workmen's Compensation Board of Nova Scotia Annual Reports (Halifax, 1917-1925). 
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severely depleted the funds of the Board for the sub-class.37 In January 1927, 
therefore, the Workmen's Compensation Board announced sharply increased 
insurance rates for the fishing industry. The rate announced was 10 per cent or $10 
for every $100 of wages paid, twice what it had been the previous year.38 
The vessel owners and the captains reacted swiftly. Within two weeks of the 
announcement by the Workmen's Compensation Board, the vessel owners 
organized meetings with the provincial government. They argued that, since it 
was not compulsory for them to participate under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, they would stop doing so and threatened to tie the vessels to the wharves in 
Lunenburg and leave them there until the Workmen's Compensation Board 
lowered its rates.39 In the face of this opposition the government gave in and 
guaranteed that the compensation rate for 1927 would remain at five per cent, still 
one of the highest for any industry. 
Although it had given way to the pressure from the vessel owners on rates, the 
provincial government decided to appoint a Royal Commission on 29 June 1927, 
to investigate the Workmen's Compensation Act as it applied to offshore 
fishermen and lumbermen.40 This investigation was underway when the disaster 
of August 1927 occurred. Despite the scale of this disaster, the Commission on 
fishermen's compensation remained out of the public eye until 12-13 October 
1927 when it convened a single hearing in Lunenburg. The chairman of the 
Commission was Carl D. Dennis, an accountant from Amherst, who appears to 
have had no previous experience in the fishing industry and no prior experience 
with the Workmen's Compensation Act. According to his report, several groups 
appeared before the Commission, including a group representing vessel owners 
and captains from Lunenburg, but no representations were made on behalf of the 
crews of the Lunenburg schooner fleet. No ordinary crew member of any offshore 
vessel appeared before the commission to give testimony. In his report Dennis 
remarked on this anomaly, but he put it down to a lack of interest on the part of 
the crew members.41 
The vessel owners and captains, plagued by uncertain prices and the loss of six 
vessels and 138 men in the two big storms, told Dennis at the Lunenburg hearing 
that if they were not removed from the Workmen's Compensation Act they would 
close down the industry in Lunenburg and go out of business, as they could not 
37 Workmen's Compensation Board of Nova Scotia, Annual Report (Halifax, 1926), p. 8. 
38 Progress-Enterprise, 26 January 1927. 
39 It is questionable whether the owners could challenge the authority of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act of Nova Scotia, particularly Section 3, and Section 8(3), to determine if 
participation was compulsory. Progress-Enterprise, 9 February 1927. 
40 Carl D. Dennis, Royal Commission on Ratings of the Lunenburg Fishing Fleet and the Lumber 
Industry as Applied by the Workmen's Compensation Board (Halifax, 1927). 
41 Dennis, Royal Commission on Lunenburg Fishing Fleet. 
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afford to pay the rates set by the Board.42 Dennis sympathized with the vessel 
owners and captains. Although he recognized that fishing, as practiced aboard 
the schooners from Lunenburg, was a dangerous occupation, his recommenda-
tions indicated his basic ignorance of the underlying concepts of worker's 
compensation by pointing to a lack of willingness on the part of the fishermen to 
pay some of the cost and querying why employers paid the full rate. He 
emphasized that other maritime countries had not included fishermen under 
worker's compensation, but there is no evidence which countries were examined 
or what consultations, if any, were held with individuals in other countries. He 
completely ignored questions of safety and accident prevention, two of the pillars 
in the philosophy behind the thinking of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
From the newspaper accounts of the Commission hearings, it seems apparent 
that the Nova Scotia Accident Prevention Association (the group charged with 
developing health and safety policy for the province) never made any submissions 
on possible steps to improve health and safety on fishing vessels, and there is no 
reason to believe that the Royal Commission ever attempted to solicit a 
submission from the association. No one raised the issue of placing proper 
fire-fighting or life saving equipment on board the vessels. 
With such a cursory and one-sided investigation, the findings were predictable. 
When the report was released in December 1927, it recommended that the fishing 
industry be relieved of the deficit run up by the fishing sub-class and the high rates 
the accident record would require under Part I of the Act. Dennis recommended 
that the Workmen's Compensation Board set a rate of 11 per cent of wages paid 
for the fishing sub-class, and noted that Lloyd's of London would offer a scheme 
at this rate.43 He assumed that over a period of eight or nine years of low accident 
rates the deficit in the fishing sub-class would be eliminated, and the rate would be 
permitted to drop. In reaching this conclusion, Dennis accepted the evidence of 
the Lunenburg captains and vessel owners, who had stated in their brief to the 
commission that the disasters of 1926 and 1927 were unusual, and had not 
occurred in the 40 years previous. In fact, while the "natural" disasters themselves 
were unusual, because of the considerable loss of life in a very short time period, 
the records of the Workmen's Compensation Board show that the incidence of 
injury and loss of life in the fishing industry had been high even before these 
disasters.44 
In January 1928, the Workmen's Compensation Board announced the insurance 
42 Herald, 20 January 1928. 
43 Dennis, Royal Commission on Lunenburg Fishing Fleet. 
44 Between 1920 and 1925 there were 162 injuries and 54 deaths in the Nova Scotia offshore fishery 
as recorded by the Workmen's Compensation Board. The rate set by the Compensation Board 
for this period was five per cent ($5 for every $100 of wages). This was a high rate for worker's 
compensation in any occupation. 
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rate proposed for the fishing sub-clâss for that year. True to its philosophy of 
setting rates that reflected the level of risk to the worker in the industry, the Board 
determined the necessary rate to be $20 per $100 of wages paid, or 20 per cent. The 
recommendation of the Board was much higher than Dennis' because the rate by 
the Board reflected what the safety record of the fishing industry had been and 
what premiums the industry needed to pay to get the kind of insurance coverage 
provided by the Board. According to the model of worker's compensation 
adopted by other industries such an increase should supply the economic 
incentive for the industry to provide a safer workplace. 
The Lunenburg captains and owners reacted as they had a year earlier and in 
their submission to the Dennis Commission. They stated that the rates were too 
high to afford, and threatened once again to leave their vessels tied to the wharves. 
Given the importance of the fishing industry to the economy of Lunenburg 
County, the captains and the owners could count on the support of local 
politicians, who were closely connected with the industry. The vessel owners' 
lobbying group included the provincial Member of the Legislative Assembly for 
the riding, W.H. Smith, and the federal Member of Parliament, W.G. Ernst.45 The 
government responded quickly. After meeting with the captains and the owners, 
on 30 January 1928 the provincial government agreed to a scheme apparently 
recommended by the vessel owners under which compensation for fishermen 
would be provided by a private insurance company. In a letter from Premier E.N. 
Rhodes to M.M. Gardner of Lunenburg, who represented the captains and vessel 
owners, the provincial government outlined the steps it was prepared to take. The 
government would enact a law removing the fishing industry from the operation 
of Part I of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but making compulsory the 
purchase of insurance up to a maximum liability of $50,000 or $60,000 per vessel. 
The rate for vessel owners would remain fixed at 5 per cent, and the government 
would pay any additional amount necessary to purchase insurance. In addition, 
the vessel owners were to be released from the obligation to repay the deficit 
already built up with the Compensation Board.46 These recommendations were 
passed into law in March 1928. Although still covered by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, offshore fishermen were now placed under a new section of 
the Act, Part III, which provided that instead of the Workmen's Compensation 
Board setting the rates, collecting the premiums, and paying the claims, a private 
insurance company would assume these duties.47 No other group of workers in 
Nova Scotia was subjected to such treatment. 
45 Herald, 20 January 1928. 
46 Herald, 30 January 1928. 
47 Workmen's Compensation Act, Part III, Sections 91-120, Statutes of Nova Scotia (Halifax, 
1928), ch. 42, pp. 182-92. 
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This decision placed fishermen in a position where they were outside whatever 
public scrutiny the Workmen's Compensation Board could provide, and yet were 
denied the opportunity to sue the vessel owners through the courts for unsafe 
conditions. Under the new plan fishermen were no longer eligible for burial 
expenses, medical aid, artificial prosthesis, or the right to rehabilitation.48 These 
now became the responsibility of the fisherman or his family. If a fisherman 
wanted this coverage he could pay for it himself through the Sick Mariners' Fund, 
a medical insurance plan for mariners.49 Even more clearly than previously, under 
the private compensation scheme coverage was limited to those fishermen and 
their immediate families who were resident in Nova Scotia.50 Fishermen from 
Newfoundland who came to Nova Scotia to work on the offshore fleet but whose 
families remained at home were excluded. Although a fisherman or his family had 
the right to appeal decisions concerning eligibility or the amount of an award, the 
system was stacked against them. County Court Judges heard such cases and 
acted as arbitrators.51 A fisherman wishing to appeal an award faced the daunting 
choice of hiring an expensive lawyer or presenting the case himself. A financially 
insecure fisherman in an isolated fishing village might well find it difficult to 
obtain access to a lawyer and even if he did, his chances of affording such legal aid 
were slim. 
In general, inadequate as compensation had been for the fishermen under the 
Workmen's Compensation Board, their coverage and the difficulty of getting an 
impartial hearing for claims was worse under the private scheme. Vessel owners or 
managing owners had a direct interest in keeping the rates low and their expenses 
down; reducing awards meant reducing costs. Fishermen who attempted to 
challenge the decisions of the insurance company faced the possibility of 
blacklisting. The interests of the vessel owners took precedence over any interests 
that might be expressed on behalf of the fishermen within this private structure. 
Thus, privatization of the insurance scheme relieved the vessel owners from any 
heavy costs resulting from death or injury to fishermen. Moreover, additional 
48 Terms and Conditions of 1928 Private Insurance Policy from William Currie Agencies Ltd., F. E. 
Zwicker Papers, Section (H), MS 4, 37, File 319, Dalhousie University Archives. 
49 A holdover from the days prior to Confederation, the Sick Mariners Fund was initially a medical 
aid plan for all injured seamen. Administered after Confederation by the Department of Marine 
and Fisheries, after 1945 it was transferred to the Department of National Health and 
Welfare. 
50 Terms and Conditions of 1928 Private Insurance Policy from William Currie Agencies Ltd., FE. 
Zwicker Papers, Section H, MS 4, 37, File 319, Dalhousie University Archives. 
51 "Maritime Fish Corporation vs Cohoon" in The Labour Gazette (April 1930), pp. 475-6. The 
case of Maritime Fish Corporation vs Cohoon best exemplifies how the system worked. Cohoon 
appealed a decision on worker's compensation to the County Court Judge in Antigonish. The 
Judge found in his favour. The Maritime Fish Corporation appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Nova Scotia and had the County Court Judge's decision reversed. 
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subsidies were provided by the government to the vessel owners with this change. 
The debt that had been incurred by the fishing industry to the Workmen's 
Compensation Board as a result of claims exceeding premiums over the previous 
seven years, amounting to $357,680, was written off. The provincial government 
further subsidized the Lunenburg fleet by a direct payment of $13,690 from the 
Provincial Treasury in 1928 to William Currie Agencies Limited of Halifax, a 
private insurance company.52 This subsidy was geared specifically to the 74 vessels 
of the Lunenburg fleet — no other vessels involved in the offshore fishery in Nova 
Scotia, such as the side trawlers or the schooners from ports outside of 
Lunenburg, were included.53 Although a private insurance company now judged 
the validity of the claims, the Workmen's Compensation Board was still used to 
register claims, and the Board's forms were used.54 The work completed by the 
Board was done without fees levied against either the employers or the private 
insurance companies. How this practice was justified inside the Workmen's 
Compensation Board is not clear, but it constituted another form of government 
subsidization of the private insurance plan.55 
The Halifax Herald, in an editorial on 30 January 1928, cited the decision taken 
by the Provincial Government to remove fishermen from Part I of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act as "Solving a Problem".56 Although this editorial was written 
in the aftermath of the greatest single disaster to occur in the history of the 
offshore fishing industry in Nova Scotia, it did not see that the problem was to 
make the vessels safer, but emphasized the need to keep the fleet fishing. There is 
no record of any formal inquiry into health and safety conditions on the vessels. 
Radios for communication with the land were placed aboard the schooners after 
this disaster but this was technology that had been available and in use in the 
fishing industry for the previous 15 years.57 Instead of examining the causes for 
52 The private insurance plan operated through large insurance companies known as Protection 
and Indemnity Associations ("P" and "I" Clubs) in Britain, associated with Lloyds of London, 
and initially represented in Nova Scotia by William Currie Ltd. of Halifax. After many 
complaints of this company's inefficiency the Lunenburg vessel owners replaced it in 1932 with 
the Lunenburg Fishermen's Mutual Relief Association, organized and run by the owners 
themselves. Correspondence between Zwicker and William Currie Agencies, F.E. Zwicker 
Papers, Section (H), MS 4, 37, File 357, 376, Dalhousie University Archives. 
53 Public Accounts of Nova Scotia 1927-1928, pp. x-xi, Legislative Library, Province House, 
Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
54 Correspondence from Workmen's Compensation Board to E.H. Armstrong, 13 September 1929, 
E.H. Armstrong Papers, MG 2, vol. 7, F2/2094, PANS. 
55 Correspondence from Workmen's Compensation Board to E.H. Armstrong, September/ 
October 1929, E.H. Armstrong Papers, MG 2, vol.7, F2/ 2094, 2108, 2111, 2113, PANS. 
Workmen's Compensation Board form with the name of William Currie's Agency typed in on the 
form, FE. Zwicker Papers, Section (H) MS 4, 37, File 319, Dalhousie University Archives. 
56 Halifax Herald editorial, 30 January 1928, E.N. Rhodes Papers, MG 2, vol. 635, No. 32006, 
PANS. 
57 One of the causes for the Newfoundland sealing disaster of 1914 is attributed to the failure of all 
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the disaster, the provincial government and the Lunenburg vessel owners 
developed rationalizations which not only explained away its occurrence but also 
relieved the fishing industry of any burden of responsibility. 
The Nova Scotia government, in its privatization of compensation and neglect 
of safety in the fishing industry seems to have hoped responsibility for safety 
measures in the fishery would be assumed by the federal government. In the 1928 
Speech from the Throne the provincial government stated that "it is their 
expectation that the federal government will assume the full burden of their 
responsibility which arises out of its jurisdiction over and control of the 
fisheries".58 This optimism arose out of the appointment of the 1927 MacLean 
Royal Commission by the federal government to investigate problems in the East 
Coast fisheries.59 Although the MacLean Commission held meetings all over the 
Maritimes, it was mainly concerned with the inshore fishery and heard testimony 
from only offshore fishing captains; no crew member from any offshore vessel 
gave testimony before the Commission. But since the Commission was conduct-
ing its hearings at the same time as the controversy over the rates for worker's 
compensation for the fishing sub-class, both the vessel owners and captains from 
Lunenburg and the provincial government made representations. However, when 
the MacLean report was released in 1928, it stated that the question of federal 
jurisdiction for workers' compensation for fishermen was outside its mandate. 
The hope of the provincial government that the federal government would take 
the problems of both safety and an adequate compensation system for fishermen 
off its hands was never to be realized. In fact, neither the federal nor provincial 
government were prepared to take responsibility for ensuring reasonable 
compensation or safety standards for fishermen. Privatization moved the issue 
away from public attention and provided both governments with a method of 
evading their responsibilities. Fishermen were to remain in this situation for 
another 43 years,until 1971, when as a result of a commission of enquiry and the 
local organizing efforts of British Columbia's United Fishermen and Allied 
Workers Union, they were once again placed under Part I of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
In part the Nova Scotia government's attitude indicates how much the state 
was willing to do for private interests, particularly the Lunenburg fish companies 
who could mount a strong political lobby. Yet one must also consider the 
generally depressed economy of Nova Scotia, the rapid decline of manufacturing 
in the province after World War I, and the subsequent high rates of unemploy-
ment, poverty, and outmigration. Between 1919 and 1926 there was a consider-
sealing vessels to carry wireless radios. See Cassie Brown, Death on the Ice (New York, 1972). 
58 Parts lOand 11 of the text of the Speech from the Throne of the Third Session of the 38th General 
Assembly, Province of Nova Scotia, E.N. Rhodes Papers, vol. 625, no. 16, PANS. 
59 Herald, 14 October 1927. 
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able loss of jobs in the province, as industries shut down or relocated elsewhere.60 
In Cape Breton, the determination of the British Empire Steel and Coal 
Corporation (BESCO) to cut wages had resulted in numerous strikes in the coal 
mines. Given the precarious state of coal mining, an industry on which the 
provincial government relied heavily for revenue, a crisis in another industry was 
something the province could not afford at this point.61 
Moreover, the fishing economy of Nova Scotia was in decline after 1920. Ruth 
Fulton Grant in The Canadian Atlantic Fishery points out that the price for a 
quintal (1121bs.) of dry salt cod declined from a high of $10.30 in the period 
1916-1920 to a low of $3.50 a quintal in 1932.62 Internationally there was a decline 
in the price of salt fish, which in turn led to fierce competition in the international 
market. Countries such as Iceland and Norway, which had socialist governments 
and which had introduced economic planning into their fisheries, were able to 
supply consistently high quality products drawing top dollar on the market. Nova 
Scotia fish merchants rejected any such "socialistic" approach and continued to 
apply 19th century free-enterprise methods, which consisted mainly of undercut-
ting each other on the international market. To maintain profit margins, the lower 
prices the merchants received were compensated for by the lowered amount they 
gave to the primary producers, the fishermen.63 Since these merchants were 
almost always the owners of the offshore fishing vessels, they had little incentive 
to improve the technology or the safety conditions on these vessels. As long as 
they could, they clung to the old ways, and the costs of the fishery were borne by 
the ordinary fishermen. Because their power in the fishing communities met few 
challenges, these merchants and schooner owners were not forced to find ways of 
rationalizing the industry or increasing efficiency. 
Offshore fishermen lacked the power to influence these decisions. They were 
hired and fired by either the owner of the vessel or the captain, who acted on the 
owner's behalf. Each fisherman relied on patronage to ensure gaining "a sight" 
(a job) on a vessel;64 thus fishermen as individuals were very much under the 
economic control of their employers. This was true of workers in most 
industries, but the degree of dependency of the fishermen was in many respects 
greater than other workers. The "truck" system still functioned in the inshore 
industry and many of the components of the social relations of production 
which existed there prevailed in the offshore industry as well. The economy of 
60 Ernest Forbes, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927 (Montreal and Kingston, 1979), pp. 
54-72. 
61 David Frank, "Class Conflict in the Coal Industry", in Gregory S. Kealey and Peter Warrian, 
eds., Essays in Working Class History (Toronto 1976), pp. 161-84. 
62 Ruth Fulton Grant, The Canadian Atlantic Fishery (Toronto, 1934), p.76. 
63 Ibid., pp.31-4, 75-7. 
64 Wallace, Roving Fisherman, p. 11. 
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the inshore industry was characterized by a specific form of unequal exchange 
between the fish buyer and the fisherman. Credit, at prices set by the merchant, 
was advanced to maintain the fisherman and his family over the winter. In 
return the fisherman had to sell the merchant all of his fish at a price also 
determined by the merchant. The resulting economic relationship allowed the 
fish merchant to wield far more power than that wielded by capitalists in other 
buyer-seller relationships.65 The truck system as it functioned in the offshore 
fishery similarly entailed strong relations of dependency of the fisherman on the 
vessel owner. The fish company or vessel owner made credit arrangements with 
general merchants in the outports to supply the family with supplies while the 
vessel outfitted for the fishing voyage. After the voyage the fishermen still 
depended on the merchants' credit over the time between the landing of the fish 
and its sale in the West Indies or other markets. With a combination of low 
prices and poor catches, it was conceivable that after a voyage of two or three 
months a fisherman could wind up making nothing after repaying the merchant. 
Yet few if any fishermen had any formal education. Fishing was the only 
employment they knew and in the depressed economic conditions of the 1920s 
and 1930s, the labour market did not offer much opportunity for better 
employment.66 The offshore fishermen in these single-industry communities 
with the skipper of the vessel or the owner on a strictly one-to-one basis with the 
captain or the owner always holding the upper hand.67 
Paternalism, deference, and the lack of commonality nurtured by this system 
had much to do with the lack of the establishment of any union. At sea the 
captain ruled supreme and to question or challenge his word was considered 
mutiny. Fishermen were at sea for weeks at a time, isolated from both their 
families and fishermen on other vessels. When they arrived in port, they 
returned home to their families frequently in an outport some distance away 
from the home port of the vessel. Many of the crew members were from 
Newfoundland, and at the end of a voyage or several voyages, would return 
home, sometimes for months. This lack of commonality of residence acted to 
prevent any common bonds being formed by fishermen on different vessels, and 
further hindered any attempts to unionize.68 
65 Unpublished "Background Testimony" to the Royal Commission Investigating the Fisheries of 
the Maritimes and the Magdalen Islands, vol. 8, pp. 2848-9, 2864 in MG 6, vol. 14, PANS. R. 
Ommer, "All the Fish of the Post", Acadiensis, X, 2 (Spring 1981), pp. 107-23; Gary Hughes, Two 
Islands: Lameque and Miscou, and their State of Bondage (Saint John, 1979). 
66 Most fishermen who had the chance left for more lucrative, though illegal, employment in the 
rum running business, in which one could make more money in one month than one could make 
in a whole year fishing. Personal Interview with Loraine Weagle, dory fisherman and engineer on 
a rumrunner, Dayspring, Lunenburg County, July 1987. 
67 Gene Barrett, "Capitalism and the Fishery of Atlantic Canada", unpublished paper, Saint Mary's 
University, 1986, pp.33-7. 
68 Attempts to unionize fishermen date back to 1905 when the American Federation of Labour 
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There is a strong contrast between the government reaction to the 1926 and 
1927 "August Gales" and the aftermath to disasters in the Nova Scotia coal 
mines, which were invariably followed by official inquiries and eventually by 
improvements in safety conditions in the mines and in the compensation 
available for miners injured or killed on the job. After the August gales of 
1926-1927, radios were provided for communications and engines for greater 
stability, but these changes were entirely voluntary on the part of the fishing 
vessel owners and captains. For example, there was no government regulation 
that if a vessel had a radio on board, it had to be working, or even that there had 
to be someone on board who knew how to use it. 
The difference between the mining and fishing industries was surely the 
existence of a powerful miners' trade union movement that could bring 
considerable pressure on the government and demand improvements. Without 
being forced to act by a strong union defending fishermen's interests, the 
government, like the fish companies, was unwilling to do anything about the 
backwardness, inefficiency and irrationality in the Nova Scotia fishing industry 
— the causes of its weakness in the world market. It preferred to preserve the 
existing conditions in the industry, at the cost of the fishermen of the province. 
This cost, over many years, not only included very poor remuneration for 
back-breaking and dangerous work, but also inadequate compensation for 
death or injury and deplorable safety conditions. It is a sad commentary that 
even a disaster like the August gales failed to change this reality. 
made forays among inshore fishermen in the province. See Robert H. Babcock, Gompers in 
Canada (Toronto, 1974), p. 120 and Gene L. Barrett, "Nova Scotia Fishermen's Unions" in 
Robert Brym and James Sacouman, eds. Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic 
Canada (Toronto, 1979), pp. 127-60. 
